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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Marci Hamilton has written a forceful and obviously heartfelt book that should give pause to committed champions of religious
free exercise.1 She argues convincingly that religious freedom is too
*
This is an essay reviewing Professor Marci A. Hamilton’s book, GOD VS. THE
GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
** J.S.D. (candidate), LL.M. Columbia University School of Law, J.D. Boston
University School of Law, A.M. Harvard University, A.B. Duke University. I am very
grateful to Kent Greenawalt for his unflagging kindness, encouragement, and thoughtful
criticisms. I also thank Philip Hamburger, Paul Horwitz, Jay Wexler, and Stefan
Padfield for their helpful insights on several early drafts of this review, as well as the
members of the seminar on church and state at Columbia University School of Law.
1. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW
(2005).
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often invoked to shield opprobrious and socially harmful activity, and
she describes numerous examples of such abuses that make any civilized
person’s blood run cold. Her avowed aims are to debunk the “hazardous
myth”2 that religion is “inherently and always good for society”3 and to
increase public awareness of the dark side of religion in contemporary
American public life.4 She advocates a restrictive constitutional test for
government accommodation of religious practices and supports vesting
robust discretion in the legislature to determine how that test should be
administered, and by whom. To this end, she proposes a principle that
measures the social harm that protection of religious belief would entail.
“The right free exercise doctrine,” Hamilton says, “gives a wide berth to
religious belief, but follows the rule that no American may act in ways
that harm others without consequence.”5 Hamilton also repeatedly
invokes the concept of the “public good,” or “common good” or “public
interest,” as she variously calls it,6 to justify her restrained views of
religious accommodation.
This review offers a critical appraisal of God vs. the Gavel, in
particular of Professor Hamilton’s discussion of the complicated idea of
the public good and how it intersects with religious free exercise
interests. In Part II, the review explains the structure of the book and the
framework for Hamilton’s conclusions about religious accommodation.
It emphasizes several instances of Hamilton’s use and explanation of the
concept of the public good. Part III articulates Hamilton’s general
theory of the public good, breaking the concept down into several
distinct categories suggested by the book itself. The review critiques the
book’s explanation and application of the public good principle and
suggests that it is an ambiguous and unstable concept, and one that often
substitutes either for particular interests or the author’s policy
preferences on a variety of issues.7 Part IV offers some observations
about the principal virtue of God vs. the Gavel: Professor Hamilton’s
bracing and illuminating exposition of the recent and ongoing abuses
that have been justified in the name of free exercise of religion. The
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id. at 274.
4. Id. Hamilton presents herself as a religious person who “like many
Americans” was once a “Pollyanna when it came to religion,” but has, through the
crucible of her extensive experiences as a litigator against religious accommodation in a
variety of contexts, realized the error and naiveté of her earlier views. Id.
5. Id. at 272. As Hamilton recognizes, the harm principle has deep roots in the
political philosophies of John Locke and John Stuart Mill (as well as many others,
particularly those of utilitarian persuasion) and influenced the views and attitudes of the
founding era. Id. at 260-63.
6. Since Hamilton uses these phrases interchangeably, I will do so as well.
7. I make this claim only with reference to Hamilton’s arguments about the
public good, not as a general statement of skepticism about public good conceptions.
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review concludes by considering whether religious interests can ever
play a role in the determination of Hamilton’s public good, and if so, in
what way.
II. GOD VS. THE GAVEL
Hamilton divides her book into two parts. The first discusses six
contexts in which religions or religious devotees have used their
constitutionally privileged status to protect themselves unjustifiably or
improperly advance their interests. The second sets forth the state of
constitutional free exercise doctrine, with particular positive emphasis
on Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith8 and
City of Boerne v. Flores.9 It defends the principles underlying those
cases by tracing the historic decline of the idea of religious
accommodation. In the final chapter, Hamilton posits “three necessary
conditions for legitimate religious accommodation,” the last of which
focuses on Hamilton’s key concept of the public good.10
A. “God,” or the Danger from Religion
Despite occasional reference to the beneficent power of religion and
religious belief, God vs. the Gavel is about religion as a force of evil.11
It is also driven by the six real life, self-consciously concretized contexts
that Hamilton examines, each one chock full of actual cases and specifics.
Some of the cases are ongoing and Hamilton herself has participated as
an advocate in several of them. This fact-intensive approach befits
Hamilton’s own educative mission for the book. She is none too keen
on the insulated blindness of the ivory tower; experience with actual
cases, in her view, is a much needed antidote to what she believes is the
commonly shared, “rose-colored,” idealized conception of the role of
religion in American culture.12 Hamilton’s highly contextualized approach
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Hamilton represented the City of Boerne, Texas, which
prevailed. Id. at 509, 536.
10. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 275.
11. See, e.g., id. at 4-5, 7, 306. “Were all religious institutions and individuals
always beneficial to the public, this book would not be needed.” Id. at 273.
12. Id. at 7-8. Her preference for the experiential over the theoretical, or at least
her belief that these perspectives can be profoundly opposed ways of looking at the
world, appears in her other work and is a relevant theme for this review. See, e.g., Marci
A. Hamilton, What Does Religion Mean in the Public Square?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1153,
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informs approximately two-thirds of the book. She explores in these
sections the harmful role that religious institutions have played in the
lives of children and the active debates about marriage, land use,
schools, prisons and the military, and discrimination.
Hamilton begins with the sexual and physical abuse of children by
persons either operating under religious auspices or motivated by
religious belief. She provides several examples of misused religious
authority that have led to the tragic and horrifying abuse of children,
offering newspaper-style summaries of the facts and litigation history of
past and ongoing cases.13 She also excoriates religious institutions for
“actively aid[ing] and abet[ting] the abuse,”14 though what she generally
means is that the institutions’ reaction to evidence of abuse was often to
suppress the evidence and insist on silence in an effort to protect their
finances and public image.15 Hamilton bristles with indignation at the
abuses and the cover-ups, and at this point the building blocks of her
general theory of religious accommodation begin to appear: “A church
does have the right to believe at will, but it has no right to use those
beliefs to justify illegal conduct. In effect, this reading [the one she
opposes] of the First Amendment immunizes actions that display callous
disregard for society’s most important norms.”16 After her comparatively
lengthy treatment of sexual abuse, Hamilton discusses several other
issues relevant to the welfare of children, including medical neglect,17
child abandonment,18 physical abuse,19 and failure to provide a safe
environment for children.20 She peppers each topic with highly disturbing
accounts of child exploitation in the name of religious freedom.

1157-58 (2005) (reviewing JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION (2004) and
stating that “[Stout] is an ethicist who has resolutely refused to lock himself into the
ivory tower to construct the theory that ‘explains it all,’ and instead, by walking among
his fellow citizens, has identified a complex discourse, incapable of being captured by an
either/or formula”). There is more than an element of self-effacement and irony in her
position on this issue. Hamilton is herself a prominent legal academic whose views on
religious accommodation have changed dramatically over the years. See Marci A.
Hamilton, Religion and the Law in the Clinton Era: An Anti-Madisonian Legacy, 63
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 359 n.89 (2000) (attributing her old views to “the musings of a
young and ill-informed scholar, too much at home in the ivory tower”).
13. E.g., HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 13-25.
14. Id. at 14; see also id. at 30.
15. Id. at 14-15. Though Hamilton does not discuss it in her examples, a stronger
case for “actively aiding and abetting” might be made where an institution reassigns a
cleric, knowing of his past abuse of children, to a different community without warning
the new community.
16. Id. at 26.
17. Id. at 31-39.
18. Id. at 39-40.
19. Id. at 40-44.
20. Id. at 44-46.
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How is it that U.S. law and society have failed to protect these
children? The answer, Hamilton claims, lies in the historic misuse of the
First Amendment to shield religious organizations from liability for the
harm they do. According to Hamilton, this “false understanding of free
exercise” was finally rectified in the Supreme Court’s Smith decision,
which “explained that neutral, generally applicable laws certainly can be
applied to religious conduct.”21
Further fault lies in two fallacies of the popular imagination: the
American love affair with religion already mentioned and the belief
that contemporary society is hostile to religion and religious values.
Hamilton blames certain academic voices for feeding into these
misapprehensions.22 Her bête noire on this score is Professor Stephen
Carter’s The Culture of Disbelief,23 which she claims misrepresents the
realities that most people in the country are religious believers,24 that
religious viewpoints “fill the public square,”25 that religion is not
“always moral . . . [or] as innocuous as apple pie,”26 and that religious
interests are not “politically powerless.”27 Hamilton contends that the
perpetuation of these myths by Carter and others has enabled religious
organizations to stage a kind of socio-legal power grab, all the while
maintaining the appearance of weakness.28
All of this is rather hasty. Nowhere in his book does Carter claim that
most people in the country are not religious or that religion does not
affect the public views of many Americans or that religious interests are
politically powerless:
[R]eligion matters to people, and matters a lot. Surveys indicate that Americans
are far more likely to believe in God and to attend worship services regularly
than any other people in the Western world. True, nobody prays on prime-time
television unless religion is a part of the plot, but strong majorities of citizens
tell pollsters that their religious beliefs are of great importance to them in their
21. Id. at 47. Smith held that the Free Exercise Clause was not offended by
Oregon’s criminalization of the religiously inspired use of peyote by certain Native
Americans. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890
(1990). After the plaintiffs were fired from their jobs, the state denied them
unemployment benefits. Id. at 874.
22. See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
23. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
24. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 7.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 48.
27. Id. at 291.
28. Id.
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daily lives. . . . And today, to the frustration of many opinion leaders in both the
legal and political cultures, religion as a moral force and perhaps a political one
too, is surging.29

Likewise, though Carter certainly does discuss at length the moral
dimensions of religious belief and its important role in American public
life, he does not claim that religion always and everywhere has been
benign or that it should be unthinkingly embraced:
The religions enjoy no special immunity from the tendency of power to
corrupt—and of absolute power to corrupt absolutely. As I write these words,
people are being slaughtered for their religious beliefs in India, in Bosnia, and
in various parts of the Middle East. Closer to home, . . . the African slave trade
and the post-Civil War oppression of the freed slaves and their progeny were
often justified by a variety of Scriptural passages and Christian doctrines.
Indeed, there is virtually no evil that one can name that has not been done, at
some time and at some place and to some real person, in the name of religion.30

It is true that Carter advocates a prominent place for religious thought
and belief in the public square, but he also says:
Yet one who argues, as I do, for a strong public role for the religions as
bulwarks against state authority must always be on guard against the
possibility—no, let us say the likelihood—that some religions will try to use the
privileged societal position that the First Amendment grants them as an
instrument of oppression.31

The point of this seeming petulance is certainly not to engage
Hamilton in a game of “gotcha” with respect to what may generously be
called an incidental point in her argument. It is instead to note a
leitmotiv in her presentation of ideas, and one which will resurface at the
climactic point when she must defend her own crucial concept of the
public good. It is this: Hamilton comes on very strong, often exuding an
insistent and facile certitude about the particular policies she favors.
This is understandable given her profound involvement in a longrunning, “fundamental difference of opinion”32 between Congress and
the Supreme Court that began in 1990, and her sincere belief in the
rightness of Smith and Boerne.33 Her passionate voice makes for
stimulating reading, particularly when it comes to the specifics of the
gripping cases and legislative histories with which she has developed
29. CARTER, supra note 23, at 4.
30. Id. at 83 (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at 85. In considering the problems involving teaching about religion in
public school, Carter emphasizes that students should study the negative as well as
positive role of religion in American history. Id. at 207; see also Jay D. Wexler,
Preparing for the Clothed Public Square: Teaching About Religion, Civic Education,
and the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1257 (2002).
32. Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of
Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 153 (1997).
33. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 214.
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such mastery. But it is less effective when she presents and analyzes
concepts relevant, either because she opposes or espouses them, to her
philosophical and constitutional views.34
Hamilton’s chapter on marriage provides a useful example of this
phenomenon. The first subpart treats gay marriage and addresses the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s (SJC) well-known decision35
and the federal legislature’s critical response in 2004.36 Hamilton makes
plain that she sides with the SJC and the right of gay people to marry.
She believes that those opposed to gay marriage are interposing their
religious beliefs where they have no business and are thereby subverting
the public good: “Once the debate cannot be framed by one religious
tradition, the door has been opened to a more appropriate public debate
over the common good.”37 Hamilton roundly criticizes the views of
Professor Robert P. George, a prominent natural law theorist who
opposes gay marriage. Relying on George’s comments in a Wall Street
Journal op-ed, Hamilton characterizes the natural law position on gay
marriage by remarking:
Apparently, [according to natural law] the physical characteristics of males and
females predetermine the law of marriage. [George’s] circular reasoning
implies that no legislature should consider the issue other than to reach his
religiously based conclusion, a conclusion once again that is an argument from
theocracy, not public policy. Accordingly, he promoted the idea of a federal
constitutional amendment to ban all marriages other than those between a man
and a woman, without entering into the debate over what forms of marriage are
best for children, the economy, or the public good. His is a revealed legal
regime, not a reasoned one.38

34. See Steven D. Smith, Losing Jerusalem—RFRA and the Vocation of the Legal
Crusader, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 907, 913-14 (1997).
Her [the legal scholar/crusader’s] vocation mixes the role of scholar and
advocate in a way that can easily end up doing violence to both. Typically she
will not feel free simply to pursue truth wherever the search may lead. Her
“truths” must be ones that speak to current controversies as currently
formulated—otherwise she will not be participating in the legal conversation—
and they will need to favor the righteous side of those controversies.
Uncooperative truths will be of little value, or even of negative value.
Id. (footnote omitted). Professor Smith’s article was part of a symposium entitled
“Reflection on City of Boerne v. Flores,” but there is no indication that he was referring
specifically to Professor Hamilton in these remarks.
35. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
36. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 51-53.
37. Id. at 57.
38. Id. at 53-54.
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One need not be a natural law expert to sense that much is missing in
this assessment. Hamilton’s spare statements about the bases for
opposition to gay marriage from a natural law perspective39—that its
position is “revealed” rather than “reasoned,” and that it prescinds from
the debate over the common good—are, respectively, incomplete and
flatly incorrect. It is true that the Summa Theologiae was intended by
Aquinas primarily as a teaching tool for those sharing his religious
beliefs,40 and that natural law theory historically has been associated
with Roman Catholic teaching.41 But to say that a position based in
natural law is not “reasoned” but “revealed” is to ignore the highly rational,
practical impetus that adherents claim drives the natural law tradition.
John Finnis, perhaps the most famous, recent exponent of natural law,
who also opposes homosexual marriage,42 is emphatic that “practical
reason,” not revealed truth, is the guiding principle by which people may
decide what is moral.43 Of marriage, Finnis says:
The good of marriage is one of the basic human goods to which human choice
and action are directed by the first principles of practical reason. . . .
....
. . . [T]he good of marriage [is] the way of life made intelligible and
choiceworthy by its twin orientation towards the procreation, support and
education of children and the mutual support and amicitia [friendship] of
spouses who, at all levels of their being, are sexually complementary.44

39. It is misleading to speak of a monolithic “natural law view,” as there is great
variety within the modern tradition alone, to say nothing of the tradition dating from
Aquinas. The natural law theory of John Finnis, Robert George, and Germain Grisez is
not that of Lloyd Weinreb, or Michael Moore, or Mark Murphy, and so on. Moreover,
the phrase “natural law” is itself commonly used in widely divergent meta-ethical senses.
See Michael S. Moore, Law as a Functional Kind, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 188, 19092 (Robert P. George, ed. 1992) (listing four different such usages, only one of which is
tied directly to the idea that “the nature of moral qualities like goodness is given by their
having been commanded by God”).
40. Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law Theory, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 15, 17 (Martin P. Golding & William A.
Edmundson eds., 2005).
41. See Kent Greenawalt, Natural Law and Public Reasons, 47 VILL. L. REV. 531,
541 (2002).
42. E.g., John Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations:
Some Philosophical and Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 97, 99 (1997).
43. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 100-01 (1980). For a
different, highly persuasive perspective, but one that also emphasizes the connection
between religion and rationality, see Michael J. Perry, Christians, the Bible, and SameSex Unions: An Argument for Political Self-Restraint, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 449, 464
(2001) (arguing that because of the strong bond between “revelation” and “reason,”
contemporary Christians should be leery of banning or disfavoring conduct if “(a) the
belief is the subject of increasingly widespread intradenominational disagreement among
Christians themselves and (b) no persuasive argument grounded on contemporary human
experience supports the belief”).
44. Finnis, supra note 42, at 97, 118 (arguing for an interpretation of Aquinas
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In criticizing this position, it is possible that Hamilton means to say
that the natural law view of gay marriage, accepting for the sake of this
point that Finnis’s and George’s position is representative, is not
accessible to people who do not share certain religious convictions, and
so should not be relied upon in political decisionmaking. This argument
would be reminiscent of Professor Kent Greenawalt’s reflections about
whether nonaccessible grounds should be excluded as bases for political
decisions.45 Greenawalt also discusses the difficulties in disentangling
the religious and nonreligious reasons that may jointly inform a
particular political judgment.46 Hamilton might be arguing for the
exclusion of any political judgment whose basis cannot be entirely
disentangled from religious belief because religious beliefs are not
accessible, and therefore any judgment that implicates religious belief is
not accessible. But if Hamilton intended to proceed along this line of
inquiry—that is, with an eye toward arguing for the total exclusion of
the influence of religious belief from public political judgment (or
debate)—then it is odd that she unequivocally rejects the plausibility of
such an approach.47
along these lines). For George’s substantial agreement about the “intrinsic human good”
of marriage see Robert P. George, What’s Sex Got to Do With It? Marriage, Morality,
and Rationality, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 63, 70-72 (2004).
45. He writes:
What I mean by “not generally accessible” . . . [is that] the believer lacks bases
to show others the truth of what he believes. . . .
. . . This does not mean that reason plays no part in the development of
religious convictions. Possible religious understandings may be measured
against various tests of reasonableness. But something more is involved: a
choice or judgment based on personal experience that goes beyond what
reason can establish.
KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 39-40, 85-95 (1995).
A belief based on revelation would in most circumstances not be accessible, unless the
believer can point to a historical, evidentiary record to support it. Id. at 41.
46. See, e.g., id. at 88-89. Taking as his departure point the natural law view that
“virtually all . . . ethical and political truths are accessible to common human reason,
[and] that understanding these truths does not require an understanding of religious
truth,” Greenawalt dissects the problem of intertwining bases of belief:
In my discussion of what constitutes reliance on religious grounds in chapter 6,
I mentioned how religious premises may intertwine with naturalist
reasoning . . . . I also mentioned a second problem, that people may believe
natural arguments are sound because of religious authority, not because they
perceive the intrinsic force of the arguments. A third problem is a variation on
the second; someone might find the natural arguments somewhat persuasive by
themselves, but be much more certain of their truth because of religious belief.
Id. at 88.
47. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 293; see also Hamilton, What Does “Religion”
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Perhaps Hamilton means that although the Finnis/George view of gay
marriage is at some remote level accessible, it is not persuasive on
grounds of reason alone. For example, Hamilton might claim that she,
like many others, cannot reconcile the Finnis/George position by
reference to pure reason and that she therefore suspects that religious
convictions are lurking in the background. Hamilton might say that
though the natural law proponent starts with a principle that most people
would accept as rational, for example, “one of the primary goods of
marriage is procreation,” he reaches, through a step-by-step process of
what he claims is “reasoning,” conclusions that are highly controversial
and not commonly shared, for example, “homosexual marriage is
morally wrong.” To this, the natural lawyer might reply that his beliefs
are rationally discoverable by all persons, but that the measure of their
objective truth is not taken by reference to what most people happen to
believe.48 It therefore still remains for Hamilton to make clear why the
Finnis/George position on homosexual marriage cannot be explained by
reason alone. She might claim that the kind of reasoning deployed to
justify the Finnis/George view is altogether too categorical and abstract,
that it draws arbitrary and implausible distinctions and that it does not
give enough weight to real-world experience.49
Mean in the Public Square?, supra note 12, at 1158 (“No matter how finely spun the
theories that require reason and reason alone to ground public policy are, there has never
been a time in the United States when religion has not been a driving force behind social
policy, let alone altogether excluded.”). Hamilton contends that Greenawalt endorses the
exclusive position, HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 292-93, but this is a misreading. See
Kent Greenawalt, Religion and American Political Judgments, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
401, 404, 411 (2001):
My own answer to the place of religious grounds is an intermediate one . . . .
....
. . . I believe legislators [Greenawalt distinguishes between officials and
citizens, and then again among officials between legislators and judges] should
give greater weight to reasons that are generally available than to reasons they
understand are not generally available. But some reliance on religious reasons
is appropriate, especially since the generally available reasons are radically
indecisive about some crucial social problems.
Id.
48. FINNIS, supra note 43, at 30.
49. See Kent Greenawalt, How Persuasive Is Natural Law Theory?, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1647, 1667-71 (2000).
No doubt, the vast majority of the population could be under an illusion, and a
plausible theory of why that might be so [for example, that advanced by
natural law] should make us more likely to think that most people suffer in this
way than if no such theory were available. But it is also true that coherent
theories that have seemed convincing at one time appear to be shot with error,
even ridiculous, at a later time. As moral agents, we must choose between the
weight to give to theory and the weight to give to experience when the two
conflict.
Id.
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If Hamilton were to accept this argument, her second criticism of the
Finnis/George position on gay marriage, that it does not engage with
concrete “public policy” issues, could resurface at this point. Hamilton
might say that it is in the consideration of real-world experience that one
is most rational about the common good.50 Greenawalt might agree: he has
said in the context of assessing the rationality of natural law’s claims
about the wrongfulness of homosexuality and its implications for same
sex marriage51 that “we have sounder and less sound ways to reason
about moral matters, and . . . an approach in which experience receives
greater weight is sounder than highly abstract, categorical analysis.”52
But whatever the plausibility of this argument, the “common good” is
a concept of vital importance in the natural law views of George and
Finnis; it relates to the rational pursuit of self-evident human goods,
which itself implies some kind of appeal to tangible and accessible
evidence.53 Consideration of the “good of marriage” by reference to
“what forms of marriage are best for children,” either from a theoretical
or an experiential point of view, is precisely what the natural law has in
mind.54 Nevertheless, if Hamilton had wanted to take on the Finnis/George
50. Indeed, such a position would be consistent with Hamilton’s generally
practical-minded, experience-based approach throughout the book.
51. Greenawalt is primarily addressing the natural law position that consenting
homosexual acts are morally defective, rather than any resulting implications of that
position for criminal penalties or same sex marriage. Id. at 1666. Nevertheless, his
treatment of this issue often spills into a discussion of the good of marriage, particularly
the good of sexual intercourse within marriage. Id. at 1669.
52. Id. at 1673.
53. See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 43, at 134-60; Robert P. George, The Concept of
Public Morality, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 19 (2000). I mean “self-evident” in the way Finnis
uses that term. A proposition is self-evident if it is not rationally derivable from some
other proposition. FINNIS, supra note 43, at 70. Self-evidence in this sense does not
necessarily entail universal acceptance because people may be deceived for a variety of
reasons.
54. It is not clear whether Hamilton would include the “good” of procreation on
her list, but in American law historically it has certainly been counted important as a
public good. Procreation has been deemed a fundamental private good as well, but that
is not relevant for this discussion. See, e.g., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 796 (5th Cir.
1975) (stating that “procreation of offspring could be considered one of the major
purposes of marriage”); Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980)
(observing that a “state has a compelling interest in encouraging and fostering
procreation of the race”), aff’d, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982); Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal.
87, 103 (1859) (“[T]he first purpose of matrimony, by the laws of nature and society, is
procreation.”); Zoglio v. Zoglio, 157 A.2d 627, 628 (D.C. 1960) (“One of the primary
purposes of matrimony is procreation.”); Lyon v. Barney, 132 Ill. App. 45, 50 (1907)
(“[T]he procreating of the human species is regarded, at least theoretically, as the
primary purpose of marriage . . . .”); Stegienko v. Stegienko, 295 N.W. 252, 254 (Mich.
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position as I have suggested, she might have found an inquiry into the
theoretical/experiential bases of reason and the public good a fruitful
one.
This is not the place for full assessments of these difficult views and
Professor Hamilton is, of course, at liberty to disagree with George’s
rejection of gay marriage as inconsistent with the common good. But
Hamilton’s critique of natural law theory as sub- or supra-rational
requires greater elaboration and it is hard to know what to make of her
claim that natural law fails to account for the common good. Again,
these may appear to be quibbles about nonessential matters, but they are
germane to Hamilton’s explanation and defense of her own public good
concept.
Hamilton concludes Chapter Three with a discussion of polygamous
marriage.55 After presenting Mormon arguments for the legal protection
of polygamy, and noting that there is no constitutional right to
polygamous marriage, Hamilton poses three nearly identical tests for
measuring whether polygamy should be accommodated: (1)“[t]he
question is not whether polygamists may trump the law, but rather
whether polygamy can coincide with the public good”;56 (2) “[t]he
question for public policy is whether the practice of polygamy is
consistent with what is best for society, period”;57 and (3) “[legislators]
must also always ask whether the conduct in question comports with the
public good, and that means they must examine with some care how the

1940) (stating that “procreation of children is one of the important ends of matrimony”);
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (“The institution of marriage as a
union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children
within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis.”), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810
(1972); Frost v. Frost, 181 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958) (discussing “one of
the primary purposes of marriage, to wit, the procreation of the human species”); Ramon
v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100, 108 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1942) (“The procreation of off-spring
under the natural law being the object of marriage, its permanency is the foundation of
the social order.”); Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332, 332 (1847) (“The great end of
matrimony is . . . the procreation of a progeny having a legal title to maintenance by the
father.”); Grover v. Zook, 87 P. 638, 639 (Wash. 1906) (“One of the most important
functions of wedlock is the procreation of children.”); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187,
1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (“[M]arriage exists as a protected legal institution primarily
because of societal values associated with the propagation of the human race.”); Heup v.
Heup, 172 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Wis. 1969) (“Having children is a primary purpose of
marriage.”).
None of this, of course, necessarily speaks to whether homosexual marriage threatens
the public procreative aim of marriage (the advent of reproductive technologies, such as
in vitro fertilization, may be relevant in assessing this issue), or whether the public good
of marriage has in some way changed so as to render procreation less vital.
55. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 66-77.
56. Id. at 68.
57. Id. at 72-73.
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conduct impacts others.”58 Hamilton appears to have answered these
questions for herself. She observes that many people believe that
polygamy perpetuates inequalities between the sexes and may be
inconsistent “with the rule of law and democracy.”59 Other topics
relevant to assessing the “public good” of polygamy, according to
Hamilton, should include its unclear impact on issues of child custody,
inheritance, and even the spread AIDS in Africa.60
Hamilton’s own legal expertise is showcased in Chapter Four, which
describes the conflicts that arise when religiously inclined land owners
seek to use their property in ways that threaten the character of
residential communities. She has considerable experience litigating
these cases, most often representing the party opposing the religious
accommodation, that is, the locality or the neighbors.61 She describes
vividly the acrimony generated by these disputes: a religious person who
wishes to expand his home to accommodate greater numbers of
worshippers; the often enormous increase in traffic and commerce such
plans mean for a residential neighborhood;62 the transformation of a
once-a-week house of worship into a “multiple-use social center;[]”63 the
arrival of the homeless into residential areas, seeking food, shelter, and
spiritual guidance, and the resulting deterioration of the neighborhood;64
and the inevitable legal entanglements and concomitant ill will among
neighbors, including charges of discrimination.65
Hamilton blames these problems, and many others for what she believes
is overzealous religious accommodation, on two federal statutes: the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),66 which was
partially struck down in City of Boerne v. Flores,67 and the Religious
58. Id. at 77.
59. Id. at 74.
60. Id. at 76. Hamilton’s claims against polygamy include the rhetorical question:
“If a man can marry as many women as he wants, will there ever be a solution to the
endemic problem of AIDS in Africa?” Id.
61. Id. at 84, 106; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 509 (1997).
62. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 80.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 100-01.
65. Id. at 97-98.
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (2000).
67. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). RFRA was invalidated as exceeding Congress’s
power over the states under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; it may remain
applicable as to the federal government. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 n.2
(2005) (noting that several courts of appeals have so held, but expressing no view on that
question).
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Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).68
RLUIPA requires that if the state passes a land use law that imposes a
“substantial burden” on the religious use of property, it must demonstrate
that the law serves a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive
means of furthering that interest.69 With more than a hint of bitterness,70
Hamilton argues that Congress abdicated its responsibilities to the
common good because it failed properly to explore the likely effects of
RLUIPA on the rights of homeowners and the relationships among
neighbors. She concludes, “RLUIPA has turned neighbor against
neighbor and is one of the most religiously divisive laws ever enacted in
the United States.”71
It bears reflection whether the antagonisms that Hamilton identifies
were simmering well before the two statutes were passed. RLUIPA may
have changed the legal landscape, but it seems doubtful, or at least
Hamilton has not made a strong case for the position, that RFRA and
RLUIPA created or even significantly exacerbated the hostilities
between these competing interests. “[D]ivisive religious discord”72
about the proper use of land is a product of conflicting private interests
and beliefs about the good life. As Hamilton suggests, that strife may be
driven by the evolving nature of religious practice in America and its
incompatibility with other, competing interests such as traditional
notions of home ownership, the desire for a certain kind of neighborhood
character, or a municipality’s wish to control expansion.73 Still, Hamilton’s
criticisms of RLUIPA as a potentially aggravating force in this process
ring at least partially true: by imposing a heavier burden to justify land
use laws affecting religious institutions, RLUIPA could give religious
institutions an advantage, or at least a standing, that they previously may
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to cc-5 (2000).
69. § 2000cc(a)(1).
70. She states:
In 2000, President Bill Clinton (who never met a religious cause he would not
support as President), signed RLUIPA, saying: “Today I am pleased to sign
[RLUIPA] into law . . . which will provide important protections for religious
exercise in America.” Then he praised the usual suspects behind such
legislation, Senators [Orrin] Hatch and [Edward] Kennedy. (It has not been
done yet, but one could write a book about their partnership benefiting
religious entities). Not skipping a beat, he then thanked the religious
groups . . . and the civil rights communities for “crafting this legislation.”
. . . To state his point a little more clearly, this was special interest
legislation, drafted outside Congress and then passed because the members and
the President believed the right people were behind it, not because they had
determined independently that it was a good law for the people.
HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 96 (footnote omitted).
71. Id. at 97.
72. Id. at 103.
73. Id. at 79-82.
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not have enjoyed.74 Yet this is hardly the same as contending that such
an advantage demonstrates that the public good has been disserved or
ignored. It simply demonstrates that Congress has made a choice about
where the public good lies. Undoubtedly, providing an attractive haven for
the homeless or encouraging the establishment of institutions that will
see to their spiritual and physical needs will displease neighboring
landowners. Their property values will probably suffer and the character
of their neighborhoods will change in ways they are unlikely to
appreciate. But it would not be unreasonable, or an obvious capitulation
to special interests, for a legislator to conclude that these measures
would nevertheless advance the public good.
Similarly, though Hamilton is dismissive on this front,75 the RLUIPA
legislative record “contained statistical, anecdotal and testimonial
evidence suggesting that [religious] discrimination is widespread and
typically results in the exclusion of churches and synagogues even in
places where theatres, meeting halls, and other secular assemblies are
permitted.”76 Hamilton disagrees with this characterization of the record,
argues that allegations of discrimination were fabricated or inflated for
political advantage, and believes that relevant voices were not consulted.77
These evidentiary arguments may have some merit but they do not bear
on her theoretical claims about what is best for American society.
Examining Hamilton’s larger, theoretical arguments requires an assumption
that the evidence for RLUIPA was as Congress believed it to be; only
then is it possible to discern precisely what Hamilton means by invoking
the concept of the public good to support her claim that Congress
ignored it.78
74. The weight of the additional burden will depend on an individual state’s
religious accommodation laws. Many states have zoning laws favorable to religious
interests. See Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 539
(1968) (“The greatest number of zoning ordinances grant special exemptions for
churches in residential areas provided they do not cause traffic hazards, congestion, or
excessive and untimely noise.”). Furthermore, Hamilton points out that various states
have passed their own RFRAs, and though some provide various exemptions, several
others do not. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 182-84. For those states with their own
RFRAs, particularly for those with no or few exemptions (or for exemptions other than
for prisons and land uses), RLUIPA imposes no additional burden.
75. Id. at 103-04.
76. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004).
77. See, e.g., HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 150-56.
78. It could be argued that if Congress’s primary goal in passing RLUIPA was to
eliminate religious discrimination and there is absolutely no evidence of any religious
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Hamilton’s discussion of RFRA’s and RLUIPA’s effect on the prison
system is at once fascinating and slightly irritating. She begins the
chapter by detailing the despicable activities and recruiting tactics of
prison gangs and white supremacist organizations.79 However, other
than a lonely quote from an Aryan Brotherhood member that an act of
killing is rewarding because “it’s a holy cause,”80 the connection between
these groups’ activities and their religious motivation is not readily
apparent from Hamilton’s treatment. In fact, one senses that Hamilton
may be overreaching in arguing for a pervasive link in order to lend
rhetorical support to her opposition to RLUIPA and religious
accommodation generally. To be clear, I am not suggesting that such
connections do not exist; they do. Some white supremacists do derive
their views from religious organizations, such as the Church of Jesus
Christ Christian, Aryan Nation. I mean only to point out that the book’s
portrait of the activities of white supremacist gangs, in and out of prison,
does not make clear whether religious convictions are, as a general
matter, of crucial importance to white supremacist beliefs. Still less
clear is the effect that RFRA or RLUIPA has had on the proliferation of
white supremacist belief or violence.
Hamilton’s evidence that prisons have become a breeding ground for
radical Islamic organizations is much more compelling. Also compelling is
the connection between many prisons’ failure to recruit Muslim imams
and the consequent infiltration of extremists who are more likely to
distort Islamic belief and inflame the hatred of those already susceptible
to terrorist indoctrination.81 Against the backdrop of these two problems,
Hamilton again launches into a diatribe against RLUIPA: the Act was a
craven capitulation to special interests, its likely effects were not
adequately investigated, contrary views were not sought, and the public
good was ignored.82 Hamilton is rather heated here, concluding with the
confident prediction that the Supreme Court would in short order strike
down RLUIPA.83 The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with her
in Cutter v. Wilkinson, holding that section three of RLUIPA, governing
discrimination, RLUIPA then fails to serve the public good because it targets a problem
that does not exist and possibly creates an additional source of strife. I doubt, however,
that even Hamilton would argue for such a categorical view either of Congress’s
intentions in passing RLUIPA (the potential for discrimination is only one reason to
favor religious accommodation) or of the total absence of any evidence of religious
discrimination.
79. Id. at 141-44.
80. Id. at 143.
81. Id. at 144-49.
82. Id. at 150-56.
83. Id. at 155 (“The Supreme Court will decide by July 2005 whether [RLUIPA] is
constitutional. (It’s not.)”).
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persons confined to institutions, did not violate the Establishment
Clause. 84
In answer to the question, “How much trouble can religious
accommodation [in prison] be?,”85 Hamilton reels off an impressive and
extremely amusing list of sundry dietetic, grooming-related, literary, and
sartorial requests made by prisoners on the ostensible basis of religious
belief.86 The Church of the New Song, for example, insists that its
adherents be served sherry and steak every Friday at 5:00 p.m. in order
to participate in the “celebration of life.”87 Hamilton cleverly uses this
absurd case as a foil for her anti-accommodation arguments, but at least
some of these gross abuses, as well as the cases of dangerous activity in
the name of religious belief, could be dealt with by applying Cutter’s
observations about institutional competence:
It bears repetition, however, that prison security is a compelling state interest,
and that deference is due to institutional officials’ expertise in this area.
Further, prison officials may appropriately question whether a prisoner’s
religiosity, asserted as the basis for a requested accommodation, is authentic.
Although RLUIPA bars inquiry into whether a particular practice is “central” to
a prisoner’s religion, the Act does not preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a
prisoner’s professed religiosity.88

Hamilton would likely disagree with this dicta from Cutter. She
would contend that courts are institutionally incompetent to perform
these kinds of inquiries; only the legislature, free from the sway of
special interests, is capable of protecting the public good.89 Before
turning to the now long-forestalled exploration of Hamilton’s concept of
the public good, in which her fondness for individualized legislation is
discussed, a word about the second part of her book is necessary.
B. “The Gavel,” or Protecting Ourselves from Religion
Part Two of the book primarily concerns Supreme Court doctrine and
constitutional history. Hamilton divides the Supreme Court’s free
84. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). Hamilton is also in the
substantial minority of scholars who believe that RLUIPA violates the Establishment
Clause. See Nelson Tebbe, Free Exercise and the Problem of Symmetry, 56 HASTINGS
L.J. 699, 745-46 nn.222 & 223 (2005).
85. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 156.
86. Id. at 157-61.
87. Id. at 163, 165.
88. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725 n.13 (citations omitted).
89. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 212.
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exercise jurisprudence into a “dominant” and a “competing” doctrine.
The dominant doctrine consists of two principles: (1) “religious entities,
just as much as any other citizen, can be forestalled and prohibited from
harming others and thus can be made to obey a myriad of laws”; and (2)
religious institutions must not be “subjected to laws that are hostile or
motivated by animus toward religion in general or any sect in particular.”90
The dominant doctrine first appeared in Reynolds v. United States,91 a
case upholding a federal antipolygamy law. Because the statute did not
target Mormons in particular, but merely expressed a neutral public
policy preference against polygamy, Hamilton argues, the law satisfied
both strands of the dominant doctrine.92 In contrast, Hamilton contends
that where religious animus is “patent,” as in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,93 the second strand of the dominant
doctrine is violated and courts may properly intervene. The Court’s
“competing” doctrine is an aberrant strain of free exercise cases that
applies strict scrutiny, at least in name,94 to generally applicable, neutral
laws.95 The competing doctrine was repudiated in Smith, “and the rule
of law prevailed.”96
90. Id. at 210-11.
91. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
92. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 211.
93. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). In fact, the conclusion that the city of Hialeah displayed
anti-religious motive only received two votes. Id. at 540-42 (Kennedy & Stevens, JJ.).
The basis for the Court’s holding was that the city ordinance was not of general
applicability: it gave greater protection to nonreligious killing of animals than to
religiously motivated animal sacrifice. Id. at 533-40.
94. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1127-28 (1990) (arguing that though the courts have
claimed to apply strict scrutiny in these contexts, their review is often less rigorous).
95. The “competing doctrine” cases in which the religious interest prevailed comprise
the “literal handful” listed by Hamilton: Frazee v. Illinois Dep’t of Employment Sec.,
489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989) (“[T]here may exist state interests sufficient to override a
legitimate claim to the free exercise of religion. No such interest has been presented
here.”); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987)
(applying strict scrutiny to a denial of unemployment benefits to a person discharged for
refusal to work on the Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)
(applying strict scrutiny to a denial of unemployment benefits to a person who refused to
make armaments due to a religious belief); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
There is a handful of other cases in which the Court also applied strict scrutiny but
where the religious interest lost. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493
U.S. 378, 394-97 (1990) (holding that a generally applicable sales tax used as against
religious materials survived strict scrutiny); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 700
(1990) (holding strict scrutiny satisfied in denial of charitable deduction to Church of
Scientology for training sessions); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604
(1983) (holding that a denial of tax exemption to university that refused admission to
anyone involved in interracial marriage survived strict scrutiny); United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) (holding that a requirement to participate in social security
survived strict scrutiny as applied to an individual whose religious belief prohibited
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Congress reacted rapidly to Smith, as Smith itself obliquely suggested
that it might,97 by enacting RFRA, whose flaws by Hamilton’s lights
have already been discussed. The Supreme Court in Boerne responded
by invalidating RFRA as it applied to states and localities on federalism
grounds. Hamilton attributes Congress’s RFRA “overreaching” to a kind of
swollen ego. That is, Congress’s historic successes in enacting civil rights
legislation in the sixties, and the deference accorded that legislation by
the courts, grew into “dogmatic belief in the unassailability of whatever
Congress attempted.”98
The trend seemingly signaled by Smith and Boerne, hailed by
Hamilton as manifesting the proper exercise of judicial constitutional
oversight, was dealt a blow by Cutter v. Wilkinson. Relying on the principle
that there is “room for play in the joints” between the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses,99 the Court held that Congress’s special solicitude
for the religious interests of institutionalized persons was constitutional.
It may be argued that the Court’s treatment of RLUIPA in this context is
unique because the government’s control over institutionalized persons
is “severely disabling” to religious interests.100 However, the Court’s
“foremost” reason for upholding RLUIPA—that it “alleviates exceptional

participation). Presumably Hamilton would be as opposed or only slightly less opposed
to the analytical approach endorsed by these cases as she is to those in which the
religious interest prevailed. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 896-97
(1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Moreover, in each of the other cases cited by the Court to support its
categorical rule [including Lee], we rejected the particular claims before us
only after carefully weighing the competing interests. That we rejected the
free exercise claims in those cases hardly calls into question the application of
First Amendment doctrine in the first place. Indeed, it is surely unusual to
look at the vitality of a constitutional doctrine by looking to the win-loss
record of the plaintiffs who happen to come before us.
Id.
96. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 220.
97. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
98. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 229.
99. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
100. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005). On the other hand, substantial
deference is traditionally accorded to the decisions of prison administrators (in many
constitutional contexts including religious freedom) in light of safety concerns that are
also unique. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 550 (1979) (holding that a
regulation prohibiting prisoners from receiving hardcover books from any source other
than a bookstore, publisher, or book club, was rationally related to a penological
interests); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1973)
(upholding a regulation curtailing prisoner involvement with a labor union).
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government-created burdens”101—is perhaps a reference to the strong
evidentiary basis in RLUIPA’s record justifying the accommodation;
this may not distinguish it from the land use context.102
Whatever the future holds for continuing congressional efforts at
religious accommodation, Hamilton’s view that Boerne represents some
sort of historic fulcrum or “culmination of U.S. legal principles”103
seems to have been undercut to an extent by Cutter and by the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao Do Vegetal.104 Hamilton’s highly readable, though speedy,
chapter on the history of religious accommodation in England and early
America, emphasizing the decline of the moral authority of religious
institutions (the iniquities in the name of the “religion of the realm,”105
from the Inquisition to the Star Chamber to the Tower of London, are
briefly recounted)106 and the rise of the common law and the harm
principle,107 is aimed to cast the reasoning of Boerne and Smith as the
apex of enlightened thought about religious accommodation. The focus
of her final chapter, “The Path to the Public Good,” brings us to the crux
of the matter.

101. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.
102. It may, however, distinguish it from the problems of “proportionality” that led
the Court to strike down RFRA in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-33 (1997).
The Boerne Court was troubled that “RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed
remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed
to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.” Id.
On the oddity of this proportionality analysis of RFRA see Douglas Laycock,
Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 754-56
(1998) (arguing that the proportionality standard has not been applied to many other civil
rights statutes). Professor Laycock represented Archbishop Flores in City of Boerne. Id.
at 743.
103. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 237.
104. 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006). In O Centro, the Court considered the application of
RFRA with respect to the federal government’s interest in enforcing the Controlled
Substances Act against the religious use of a hallucinogenic tea, finding against the
government at the preliminary injunction stage. The Court’s willingness in O Centro to
entertain religious accommodation claims outside the context of prisons could suggest
that RLUIPA’s section 2 is not as constitutionally infirm as Professor Hamilton might
have hoped.
105. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 253.
106. Hamilton gives the austere Calvinism of the founding era a free pass because
of its allegedly justified pessimism about human nature, id. at 258-59, and its emphasis
on the idea that “each person was given a job by God to fulfill,” which for the legislator
is the pursuit of the public good. Marci A. Hamilton, Republican Democracy Is Not
Democracy, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2529, 2533 (2005); see also Marci A. Hamilton,
Direct Democracy and the Protestant Ethic, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 411, 438-51
(2004).
107. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 260.
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III. THE PUBLIC GOOD
The single greatest difficulty with Hamilton’s conception of the public
good is that it does not adequately account for the reality, which she
herself loudly proclaims, that religion is very important to many
Americans. If that is so, it is likely that people for whom religion is
important will feel that their religious beliefs can and should, at some
level, shape the public good. Hamilton appears to concede this point.108
Since religious convictions often do affect the citizenry’s (including the
legislature’s) understanding of the public good, on what grounds does
Hamilton criticize the introduction of those perspectives into the public
domain?109 Hamilton uses the concept of the public good throughout her
book and, whatever else may be said about it, she is emphatic that it is
vitally important and that religious belief alone should not establish its
contours. In what follows, this review offers and explores a number of
possible philosophical commitments that might support her theoretical
claims.
A. The Public Good as the Harm Doctrine
Hamilton often invokes the concepts of the public good and the harm
doctrine as if they meant roughly the same thing. For example:
“[R]epresentatives must consider whether the liberty accorded is
consonant with the no-harm rule. If so, the public good has been
properly served. If not, the public good, and therefore the constitutional
order, has been subverted”;110 “In a republican form of democracy like
this one, the laws are enacted to serve the larger public good, and no one
should be permitted to harm another person without account”;111 “[T]he
duties created by a democratic government—the law—are created for
the purpose of furthering the public good, which is served when bad
actors are deterred from harming others and punished if they do.”112
The overlap between the harm doctrine and the public good is least
controversial when one considers Hamilton’s arguments about child

108. Id. at 293.
109. By posing the question in this way, I do not mean to suggest that there are no
such reasons. I am simply interested in exploring Hamilton’s reasons.
110. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 279.
111. Id. at 8.
112. Id. at 278-79.
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exploitation by religiously motivated persons.113 It seems intuitively
reasonable and appealing to argue that the public good is advanced when
the physical security of children is achieved at the expense of the
“religious rights” of alleged child abusers. The same can probably be
said of the interests of religious organizations to withhold documents or
other information relevant to child abuse investigations and the interests
of religiously motivated parents to withhold necessary medical treatment
from their children. These are clear instances of substantial interests in
physical security and health competing with less important interests.
Less obvious is a situation in which the safety of schoolchildren is
measured against, say, the religious interest of a male Sikh student in
carrying a ceremonial knife under his clothing.114 At first glance, the
potential for substantial harm might intuitively outweigh the accommodation,
but adequate precautions could be taken to limit considerably the
occasions for physical harm. Naturally, the state has a compelling interest
in the safety of its students and knife carrying does not sit easily with
that interest, but Hamilton does not explain why various measures short
of prohibiting the kirpan altogether could not serve the state’s interest
just or nearly as well. For example, one court has suggested that the
kirpan could be “blunted or dulled,” as well as sewn into a sheath, in
order to protect the safety of students, and these are surely not the only
possible measures to reach a religious accommodation while at the same
time protecting student safety.115 It is not clear why Hamilton claims
that “[o]nly a flawed legal doctrine would lead a court out on such a
weak limb. Knives are knives, and children are not safe in their
presence, no matter who they are.”116 A kirpan with a dulled edge and
point, sewn into a sheath, and perhaps made of something other than
metal might satisfy the religious and state interests. Knives may be
knives, but to paraphrase Magritte, this is not a knife. It may be that a
Sikh student would not accept such an adulterated kirpan but there may
be compromises that the Sikh student could accept that would render the
kirpan safe.117
113. It is therefore no surprise that in other recent work Hamilton emphasizes this
particular context when analyzing the harm doctrine. See Marci A. Hamilton, Religious
Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099,
1204-16 (2004) (“A Case Study of the No-Harm Doctrine: The Catholic Church’s Clergy
Abuse Era”).
114. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 114-18 (describing the kirpan, which can range in
length from a few inches to as long as three feet).
115. Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 WL 477725, at *4 n.7 (9th Cir.
Sept. 2, 1994).
116. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 116.
117. The Supreme Court of Canada recently held that a school district could not
prohibit a Sikh student from carrying a kirpan without violating the right of freedom of
religion guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Multani v.
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The controversial edges of Hamilton’s harm doctrine come into focus
in some other contexts, particularly where the idea of physical harm does
not apply. For example, Hamilton might say that legislative opposition
to gay marriage harms homosexuals, in that it prevents them from
enjoying marriage, “a social construct that must be determined in light of
the common good, not by the reflection of any particular group’s
religious beliefs.”118 One possible objection, raised earlier,119 would be
that permitting homosexual marriage harms the institution of heterosexual
marriage and those engaged in it. Hamilton might then reply that the
objection is ill-taken because it injects religious belief into a secular
debate, or because the objection inappropriately relies on religious
reasons. It is difficult to see how Hamilton’s harm principle would
apply to this controversy.
“Anyone who advocates the Harm Principle owes us an account of
harm . . . .”120 What sort of harms count in Hamilton’s calculus? In the
context of religious accommodation, Professor (now Judge) Michael
McConnell has written in support of the principle that “we are free to
practice our religions so long as we do not injure others.”121 Likewise,
Professor Douglas Laycock recently stated that “some religious practices
must be regulated or prohibited to prevent some significant temporal
harm to others.”122 Both of these writers, with whom Hamilton
vigorously disagrees about the scope of religious accommodation, are
making arguments that harm is a necessary condition for enforcement of
laws that limit religious freedom; that is, absent the causing of some
serious harm, legal regulation of the free exercise of religion is
improper. Hamilton seems to be making the same claim. If all three
Comm’n Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] S.C.R. 6. It also held that the school
district could not require the student to wear a plastic or wooden kirpan, which the
student claimed would not comply with religious requirements, and noted that the
student and his parents were willing to comply “with certain conditions to ensure that it
was sealed inside his clothing.” Id. at ¶3.
118. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 67. I set aside Hamilton’s question-begging
assumption that marriage is solely a social construct.
119. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
120. R.A. Duff, Harms and Wrongs, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 13, 16 (2001).
121. McConnell, supra note 94, at 1128 (citing Stephen L. Pepper, The Conundrum
of the Free Exercise Clause—Some Reflections on Recent Cases, 9 N. KY. L. REV. 265,
289 (1982) (“[I]s there a real, tangible (palpable, concrete, measurable), non-speculative,
non-trivial injury to a legitimate, substantial state interest?”)).
122. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and
Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV.
155, 200 (2004).
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advocate the harm principle, their considerable disagreements must
derive from widely divergent applications of the doctrine.
In fact, the harm principle may no longer be a necessary condition for
exercising the state’s coercive power because “non-trivial harm
arguments are being made about practically every moral offense.”123
Focusing on the existence or nonexistence of harm cannot answer the
question of comparing harms. Nor can an emphasis on “conduct” as
distinguished from “intentions” or “attitudes” neatly identify the type or
category of harm that should concern us. As Professor R.A. Duff has
explained in the context of his theory of punishment:
The harm suffered by the victims of central mala in se crimes (such as murder,
rape, theft, violent assault) consists not just in the physically, materially, or
psychologically damaging effects of such crimes but in the fact that they are
victims of an attack on their legitimate interests—on their selves. The
harmfulness and wrongfulness of such attacks lie in the malicious,
contemptuous, or disrespectful intentions and attitudes that they manifest, as
well as their effects.124

If the harm principle ever served as a useful threshold determination,
it no longer does so. Most allegations of moral harm now meet or at
least claim to meet that threshold. For example, in Hamilton’s land use
discussion, we have already observed the clash and in some cases
incompatibility of rival interests, such as those of residential neighbors,
religious institutions and their potential adherents, and municipalities.
All of these groups could plausibly claim to be harmed by political
judgments antithetical to their interests.125 No resolution to these
conflicts is readily apparent by reference to the harm principle alone.
“Balancing the harms” is similarly unavailing if the frame of reference
for measurement is some undifferentiated, utilitarian version of the harm
principle itself.126 The interests at stake may not only be incompatible
123. Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 114 (1999).
124. R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 128 (2001).
125. See Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then
and Now, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1593, 1611 (2004):
[I]t is beside the point to argue against a doctrine of autonomy, as Professor
Hamilton does . . . , on the ground that it will immunize churches from liability
for direct batteries on unconsenting third parties—that is, for sexual abuse of
children. These and other direct batteries have always been the paradigm case
of conduct falling outside the free exercise of religion. Those who espouse the
antiexemptions position must deal with the tougher cases—the plethora of
modern laws that rely on the possibility of diffuse or distant harms to restrict
behavior today.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
126. In legal circles, perhaps the most famous contemporary expositor of the harm
doctrine was Professor Joel Feinberg. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING
(1990). Feinberg’s elaborate defense of the harm doctrine relies substantially on a
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but also incommensurable. That is, there may be no way to decide
between rival positions simply by measuring “harm,” or their respective
potential for “good” or “pleasure,” for that matter.127 How does one
measure religious liberty interests against property interests, as gauged
by their respective potential for harm? Nevertheless, Hamilton claims to
have a clear view about where the public good lies by engaging in a
straightforward application of the harm principle.
Hamilton also discusses circumstances in which the harm doctrine has
little apparent relevance to discerning the public good. For example,
Hamilton raises the relatively recent phenomenon of what she refers to
as “religious prisons” and others have called faith-based rehabilitation
programs, noting that “[t]here appears to be an increasing amount of
evidence that suggests that some religious programming in the prisons
can reduce the recidivism rate.”128 Other than the possibility that
inmates would be coerced by the state to participate in such programs
against their will (which would certainly be a harm, but which Hamilton
does not suggest is occurring), the “harm” to the participating offender
caused by religion in these programs, as Hamilton has reported them, is
difficult to locate.129 In fact, Hamilton’s skepticism about the programs

distinction between harm to “rights” and harm that merely constitutes a “hurt” or an
“offense”—what he also calls an “evil.” Id. at 45-51. On Feinberg’s account, only harm
to rights, subject to certain caveats, is properly the subject of the harm doctrine. Id. at
38. Feinberg also gives more weight to “personal” than “external” harms, a distinction
that to me seems tenuous. Id. at 59-64.
Hamilton refers in passing to Feinberg, HAMILTON, supra note 2, at 260, but she
neither discusses nor adopts Feinberg’s involved theoretical distinctions to explain her
own harm doctrine.
127. On the incommensurability of competing visions of, for example, justice and
the good life, see generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 8 (2d ed. 1984).
Every one of the arguments is logically valid or can be easily expanded so as
to be so; the conclusions do indeed follow from the premises. But the rival
premises are such that we possess no rational way of weighing the claims of
one as against the other. For each premise employs some quite different
normative or evaluative concept from the others, so that the claims made upon
us are of quite different kinds.
Id.
128. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 165.
129. I put to the side Hamilton’s suggestion that the Christian emphasis of some of
these programs “harms” other religious entities that might be interested in programs
emphasizing their own faiths. Id. at 168. That is an argument for greater, not less, use of
“religious prisons.” For a discussion of this and other questions concerning faith-based
prisons, see Marc O. DeGirolami, The New Religious Prisons and Their Retributivist
Commitments, 59 ARK. L. REV. 1 (2006).
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derives from something other than their capacity for harm.130 Thus,
while a harm calculus is in some cases intuitively related to Hamilton’s
public good considerations, the harm doctrine taken in isolation severely
underdetermines what she means to express by the public good.
B. The Public Good as the “Rule of Law” or “Ordered Liberty”
There is a kind of antagonistic symmetry in the title of the book from
which one could reasonably infer that Hamilton is contrasting religious
accommodation with the “rule of law”: as “God” opposes “the Gavel,”
so “Religion” opposes the “Rule of Law.” Hamilton often refers to the rule
of law as closely related to, if not the same as, the public good. For
example, “[t]hose who sacrifice the interests of women and children in
the name of religion, or the rights of homeowners to religious
landowners have imposed a system that demotes the public good to a
secondary value. They have subverted the rule of law.”131
Hamilton defines the rule of law as:
[A] canopy of mutual protection reached through legitimate legislative
processes, under which all members of the society must abide by the same rules
and observe the rule of no harm to others. The rule of law is diminished when
individuals may use their personal beliefs to avoid the law and to harm
others.132

Hamilton’s particular inspiration for her rule-of-law ideal as applied to
religious accommodation derives from Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
in Smith: Otherwise neutral laws of general applicability whose
incidental effect is to inhibit religious expression do not offend the First
Amendment, the alternative being an anarchic system in which “each
conscience is a law unto itself.”133
The venerable concept of the rule of law has been expounded in many
ways. Ronald Dworkin, for one, focuses on the political use of force:
130. Id. at 168-69.
With the seemingly intractable problems in most prisons, the temptation to
treat religious prisons as a cure-all is strong . . . . But prison systems cannot
suddenly dispose of sensible criminology principles, according to most
experts. For example, as important as constructive religion may be in reducing
the recidivism rate, religious programming should not replace other factors that
are also known to help, including counseling, drug and alcohol abuse
treatment, and job instruction.
Id. Hamilton obviously attacks a straw man here (Has anyone actually suggested that
“religious programming” should “replace” counseling in prison?) but, in any event, these
claims have little connection to the harm doctrine.
131. Id. at 304; see also id. at 219 (praising scholars who opposed the “competing
doctrine” of constitutional religious accommodation discussed earlier as defenders of the
rule of law).
132. Id. at 303.
133. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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Law insists that force not be used or withheld, no matter how useful that would
be to ends in view, no matter how beneficial or noble these ends, except as
licensed or required by individual rights and responsibilities flowing from past
political decisions about when collective force is justified.
. . . This characterization of the concept of law sets out, in suitably airy form,
what is sometimes called the “rule” of law. It is compatible with a great many
competing claims about exactly which rights and responsibilities . . . do follow
from past political decisions of the right sort and for that reason do license or
require coercive enforcement.134

There is obviously one aspect of the rule of law, captured by Dworkin’s
position and shared by others,135 that is procedural or “instrumental”;136
laws should be clear, they should be validly enacted, they should be
applied generally and consistently, and like cases should be treated
alike.137 Similarly, Professor Ronald Cass has listed four traits of the
rule of law: (1) fidelity to rules, (2) of principled predictability, (3)
embodied in valid authority, (4) that is external to individual government
decisionmakers.138 Hamilton certainly intends at least this procedural
sense of the rule of law when she contends that “religious conduct must
be governed by the same laws that govern the rest of us.”139
This hardly ends the inquiry, however, because adherence to the
procedural sense of the rule of law does not necessarily explain why
interests in religious accommodation are “like” (all) other interests, and
should be treated as such for rule-of-law purposes. In fact, there is
prima facie constitutional evidence that religious free exercise interests
are not “like” many other interests that the law might infringe upon or
protect.140 There is no constitutional limitation on lawmaking as to the
rate of speed one may travel on a public road. A law that sets the speed
limit surely infringes on one’s freedom of movement. Few would claim,
however, that an interest in traveling as fast as one wants and an interest
in practicing one’s religion freely are “alike,” in the sense that the
government should bear the same burden to justify regulating either
activity.
134. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 93 (1986).
135. E.g., LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (1969) (listing eight problems
of an ambiguous or ineffective rule of law).
136. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 786
(1989) (interpreting FULLER, supra note 135).
137. E.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 208 (rev. ed. 1999) (“The rule of law
also implies the precept that similar cases be treated similarly.”).
138. RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 4 (2001).
139. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 310-11.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Is there, then, a more substantive sense of the rule of law that explains
Hamilton’s reliance on it to support her anti-accommodation argument?
Some would answer no.141 Those answering yes do so by reference to a
“point” or “reason” for the rule of law that Hamilton might dispute.142
For example, Professor Todd Zywicki has identified “constitutionalism”
as “[t]he first value of the rule of law.”143 By this he means that
“government power is constrained by ‘the law,’ an external force [by]
which political decision-making must abide . . . . The rule of law enhances
individual freedom by permitting individuals to choose and pursue their
own ends in life, without improper influence from the state.”144 Thus,
even those who subscribe to a more substantive vision of the rule of law
ground their understanding of the public or common good on some
concept, such as “constitutionalism,” “liberty,” or “human dignity,” distinct
from the rule of law.145 Hamilton cannot use the rule of law itself
synonymously with her conception of the public good.

141. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 211 (1979) (“If the rule of law
is the rule of the good law then to explain its nature is to propound a complete social
philosophy.”); Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in
Florida)?, 21 LAW & PHIL. 137 (2002).
142. E.g., FINNIS, supra note 43, at 270-76 (“Individuals can only be selves—i.e.
have the dignity of being ‘responsible agents’—if they are not made to live their lives for
the convenience of others but are allowed and assisted to create a subsisting identity
across a ‘lifetime.’”). For Finnis, the rule of law is thus a mechanism, valuable on its
own terms, that helps to ensure that government assists its subjects in pursuing the good
life as he envisions it. Even Finnis recognizes, however, that “the Rule of Law does not
guarantee every aspect of the common good, and sometimes it does not secure even the
substance of the common good.” Id. at 274.
For Rawls, the procedural rule of law was intimately connected with the concept of
liberty, which is itself critical to his central idea of justice as fairness, RAWLS, supra note
137, at 210-13, but Rawls also felt that breaches of the rule of law would sometimes be
necessary to protect against greater deprivations of liberty that would occur if the rule of
law were observed. Id. at 213. It is possible that Hamilton would agree with this
position, but not likely since her view of the rule of law seems to admit little exception.
143. Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, 10 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 1, 4 (2003).
144. Id. at 4, 7.
145. See Richard A. Epstein, Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional
Structure, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 152 (1987).
There is no question that the rule of law is a necessary condition for a sane and
just society. The fear of discretion that is shared by both [A.V.] Dicey and
[Friedrich] Hayek is well grounded by the more explicit modern treatment of
property rights, which shows that ill-defined property rights lead to legislative
intrigue, political favoritism, and massive uncertainty, all of which tend to
reduce the levels of both liberty and utility. But if the rule of law . . . is
necessary for a just and sound society, it is a very different question to ask
whether it is sufficient to achieve that result. . . . [T]he choice of the best, even
the best achievable, form of political organization demands more than faithful
adherence to the rule of law can provide.
Id.
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Many of the same points may be made of Hamilton’s use of the phrase
“ordered liberty” in connection with the public good in this book and
elsewhere: for example, “Judicial deference to the military in prisons is
not the end of religious liberty; it’s just ordered liberty”;146 “The liberty
that is consonant with the public good is ordered liberty, which takes
into account both liberty and the public good.”147
The phrase “ordered liberty” has a rich and controversial constitutional
history that Hamilton oddly does not mention, including its memorable
use in Palko v. Connecticut148 and its progeny. Perhaps she omits such a
discussion because her concept of ordered liberty has little to do with
advocating special protections for constitutional rights, and more to do
with a muscular view of government power. “Ordered liberty” was also
used by Chief Justice Burger in his majority opinion in Bowen v. Roy.149
Faced with a free exercise challenge, the Supreme Court in Roy upheld a
federal statute that required a state agency to use a social security
number in administering certain programs, notwithstanding the claim
that use of the number would violate plaintiffs’ Native American
religious beliefs.150 Chief Justice Burger offered this rather uninstructive
statement about ordered liberty:
The First Amendment’s guarantee that “Congress shall make no law . . .
prohibiting the free exercise” of religion holds an important place in our scheme
of ordered liberty, but the Court has steadfastly maintained that claims of
religious conviction do not automatically entitle a person to fix unilaterally the
conditions and terms of dealings with the Government.151

As an explanation of the substantive principle of “ordered liberty,” this
statement offers little in the way of guidance. To the extent that it does,
however, the principle of ordered liberty is used in Roy as an argument
in the service of greater, not less, religious freedom.152
146. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 172.
147. Hamilton, supra note 113, at 1105 (footnote omitted).
148. 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (holding that due process protects citizens against
state interferences with rights, such as the free exercise of religion, that are “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty”), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-94
(1969) (holding the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy standard applicable to state
criminal trials).
149. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
150. Id. at 695-96, 698-99.
151. Id. at 701-02.
152. On the other hand, Chief Justice Burger spoke vaguely of “ordered liberty” as
an anti-accommodationist principle in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972)
(“Although a determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice entitled to
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On Hamilton’s concept of ordered liberty and its association with the
public good, Professor Carl Esbeck’s criticisms merit lengthy reproduction:
Certainly a republic needs “ordered liberty,” and no one responsible argues to
the contrary. But the American republic is also about limited government.
Achieving [Hamilton’s] goal of the “public good” requires balance. That is,
neither church nor state is absolute, and there are some matters concerning
which neither can legitimately invade the space of the other. Professor
Hamilton’s argument assumes the very issue in debate rather than addressing it.
No one is pressing for immunity for religious institutions from the rule of law to
the detriment of the public good. Rather, the debate involves defining the
contours and limits of the public good. Who gets to decide what is good for the
public? When does a pluralistic secular society have to live without a singular
rule of law in order to accommodate the multiple opinions of what the rule
ought to be? Who gets to decide what it means to be a bishop, how he is to go
about doing his job, how intensely must he supervise the priests in his charge?
[Hamilton] obviously is outraged by the Catholic Church sex abuse cases (who
isn’t?), but the imposition of both criminal and tort liability in that worst of all
cases does not explode the idea of church autonomy. Rather, it is just a
clarification of the location of the church-state boundary such that the state may
impose liability in the extreme cases of abuse.153

Of course it is true that the concept of ordered liberty, like the rule of
law, “help[s] individuals and groups know how they may go about
pursuing their purposes under the law’s protection.”154 But ordered
liberty and the rule of law are merely starting points, fixed numbers in
the complicated equation that may or may not produce the public good;
by themselves they tell us very little about the substantive content of
Professor Hamilton’s beliefs as to where the public good actually lies.
C. The Public Good as a Legislative, Not Judicial, Function
In theory, Hamilton thinks that the legislature is institutionally
superior to all other government branches when it comes to deciding on
the proper scope of free exercise.155 Hamilton emphasizes a few
noteworthy structural virtues of the legislative process—the ability to
constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept of
ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of
conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.” (footnote omitted)).
153. Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in
the Early Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1581 n.710 (2004). Esbeck is responding
to Hamilton’s symposium contribution, see Hamilton, supra note 113, which she has
said forms the basis for some of her conclusions in God vs. the Gavel. HAMILTON, supra
note 1, at ix.
154. STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 15 (2001). Macedo continues: “Liberal constitutional
institutions have a more deeply constitutive role than the rule of law ideal signifies: they
must shape or constitute all forms of diversity over the course of time, so that people are
satisfied leading lives of bounded individual freedom.” Id.
155. See, e.g., HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 212, 275, 285, 295-98.
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take voluminous testimony pertinent to the particular issue, to consider a
wide variety of sources, to reverse or modify prior enactments, and “to
reject facts and theories presented to them”156—that render it the
preferred forum for public good determinations. There are many others.157
The practical difficulty for Hamilton is her frequent disappointment
with actual legislative decisions that ostensibly aimed at the public good
in the religious accommodation context, as well as her assessment of
Congress’s bloated delusions of grandeur in the twentieth century.158
Still, we have at least gone a short distance in defining Hamilton’s
concept of the public good: we have concluded that it is exclusively a
legislative consideration, or perhaps that it is the legislature’s
prerogative to assign it in its discretion. Nevertheless, though we may
have descried the locus of its determination, we surely have not yet
encountered a full explanation of the public good’s content. Our next
eligible interpretation builds on the legislative focus, drawing on the
implications in Hamilton’s statement that “[a]ll legislative judgments
should include consideration of the public interest in order to achieve the
ideals of a republican form of government.”159
D. The Public Good as Legislative Civic Republicanism
The tradition and not-so recent160 revival of civic republicanism is
much concerned with the “public good” as a model for political
156. Id. at 296-98. At least the last of these is overstated as a distinction from the
judiciary. Courts do have the power to disregard “facts” and frequently do so, for
example, when they make credibility determinations or rule on the admissibility of
evidence.
157. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REV. 633,
655-59 (1995) (discussing the procedural formality of legislative rules, the considerable
size of most legislatures, and the diversity of members’ backgrounds as important
institutional qualities in fulfilling the legislature’s deliberative obligations).
158. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 227 (“From the 1930s until 1995, the Supreme
Court systematically deferred to congressional exercises of power. The result was an
unaccountable, headstrong Congress that sincerely believed it held plenary power over
all issues, despite the plain meaning of the Constitution’s structure and language limiting
its powers.”).
159. Id. at 300 (emphasis added).
160. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, A Book of Laughter and Forgetting: Kalman’s
“Strange Career” and the Marketing of Civic Republicanism, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1025,
1025 (1998) (book review) (“In the mid-1980s, it was still breaking news in the legal
academy that the Lockean tradition of classical liberalism and individual rights was not
the only conception of politics to have shaped the ideas and actions of American political
actors and lawmakers.”).
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decisionmaking, especially as contrasted with the view that decisions are
best made by aggregating private preferences resulting from “deals”
among self-interested groups.161 Much of the religious accommodation
that Hamilton decries can be explained by reference to a kind of faith in
an idealized legislative civic republicanism—the hope that “the elusive
voice of the public good, momentarily audible above the din of power
politics, carries the day.”162 Hamilton refers positively, in passing, to
legislative civic republicanism as a theory that might support her ideas
about accommodation.163 She yearns for the “right sort” of legislator:
“What is desperately needed in Congress is some member who can rise
above religious lobbying to secure the larger good—members that at
least ask if there is another side to an issue raised by a religious entity,
without being its servant.”164
In laying out her arguments for legislative civic republicanism,
Hamilton contends that the U.S. legislature is not a majoritarian
institution. Once the majority elects its representatives, “[t]he system
simultaneously frees the representatives to do what is best for the
country—even if the people do not fully comprehend the issues or agree
on the course taken—but it also imposes the difficult burden on elected
representatives to make independent decisions in the larger public
interest.”165 As proof, Hamilton offers the racially prejudiced public
mood of the 1960s.166 The sentiments then prevalent, she argues, did not
prevent the federal government from enacting legislation to protect
racial and other minorities. Neither have they prevented the agendas of
“lobbyists representing the disabled, and homosexuals, and racial
161. Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in
Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1447 (2005).
162. Id.; see also Frank I. Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 18-19 (1986).
Republicanism’s “animating principle” is said to be civic virtue. Civic virtue
is in turn defined as “the willingness of citizens to subordinate their private
interests to the general good.”
Cultivation of this public spirit is
“government’s first task.” Republicanism favors a highly participatory form of
politics, involving citizens directly in dialogue and discussion, partly for the
sake of nourishing civic virtue.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5
(1986)); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539,
1548-57 (1988) (discussing the four common commitments of civic republicanism—
deliberation, political equality, universalism, and citizenship).
163. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 206.
164. Id. at 155-56.
165. Id. at 284. Hamilton is only interested in the model of civic republicanism
with respect to the legislature. She does not champion the popular civic virtue of
Montesquieu. Indeed, she is actually opposed to the model with respect to the populace
at large. See Hamilton, supra note 106, at 2533 (arguing that public majorities should
have little, if any, influence in guiding the political agenda).
166. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 284-85.
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minorities” from faring better in Congress than those of “amorphous
majorities.”167
Hamilton’s prior writings about legislative antimajoritarianism
indicate that perhaps we are on the scent of Hamilton’s public good. For
Hamilton, the dangers of popular self-rule are allayed by the Constitution’s
“delegation of decision making” responsibility to the legislature.168 Mob
rule is averted because “[r]epresentatives are free of their constituents’
instruction as they are simultaneously driven to consider the public good
in a fishbowl of public scrutiny within which they operate and seek reelection.”169
Hamilton’s belief in legislative civic republicanism is challengeable
on many fronts, space for the development of which is not possible here.
Most glaringly, her faith in the possibility of an ideal legislator,
unsullied by the whispers and tugs of special interests, is perhaps the
most confounding part of the book. Hamilton appears to have traded in
one set of rose-colored glasses for another. Though she grudgingly
acknowledges that legislatures often fail to perform their duties in the
way that she conceives them,170 she nevertheless insists that individualized
decisions by legislatures about accommodation are best suited to serve
the common good. Whither her Calvinistic pessimism,171 so prominent
when the topic was the abuses of religion or the oppressive instincts of
the general populace?
Yet even if (1) we assume that legislators are capable of performing
consistently in the ways that Hamilton suggests; and (2) we accept her
highly controversial point that the legislature can and should often act in
an antimajoritarian fashion; and (3) we also accept her somewhat
contradictory statements about the value of “pluralism” in American
society,172 we are simply left with another claim about the institutional
167. Id.
168. Marci A. Hamilton, Religion, the Rule of Law, and the Good of the Whole: A
View from the Clergy, 18 J.L. & POL. 387, 419 (2002).
169. Id. at 434.
170. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 279-80. Indeed, a great part of this book provides
evidence of legislative failures on just this front.
171. See supra note 106.
172. Hamilton praises American “pluralism” as a laudable cultural quality,
HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 66, but seems not to consider that it may be precisely that
pluralism that generates the multiplicity of very different views of the public good
(including those held by members of the legislature), many of which are infused with
some degree of religious belief. Indeed, it may fairly be said that her civic republican
and pluralist impulses are in considerable tension, theoretical as well as historical. See
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superiority of the legislature, now advocated as a matter of constitutional
design, to other institutions as the voice of the public good. If the point
is to justify legislative civic republicanism as a theory of the substantive
public good—that is, to claim that the constitutional structure itself
advances the public good—citing a few examples where the structure
may have coincided with what is for Hamilton the right result will not
do. As Hamilton herself is fully aware, there are at least as many
examples where she believes the result was wrong. If the public good is
to have any substantive content, the model of legislative civic
republicanism cannot provide it.
E. The Public Good as Policy Preference
The preceding sections examined four possible overarching commitments
that might have supported Hamilton’s public good, ones that she herself
intimated were closely related to the concept. None of them was
successful. Perhaps the problem is that Hamilton perceives the public
good as a much more pragmatic affair. On this view, each legislator is
simply to choose whatever policies she prefers, free from untoward
influences, of course, given any particular set of circumstances. Laws
that provide categorically for religious accommodation, as any other
categorical law, limit the legislator’s freedom to decide as she wills.
There is no doubt that Hamilton favors certain policies over others,
and prefers many policies over those that advance religious accommodation.
For example, religious accommodation is less important to her than
historic preservation,173 preventing the spread of AIDS in Africa,174
clarity with respect to issues of child custody and inheritance,175 the right
of homosexuals to marry,176 and the interests of residential homeowners

David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1706 (2005)
(tracing the rise of theories of “participatory” and then “deliberative” democracy,
including civic republicanism, as explicit reactions against the older theories
emphasizing pluralism). Professor Sklansky has these relevant comments on the deep
divisions between the two theories:
Theories of . . . deliberative democracy reject the pluralists’ reliance on
leadership elites, group competition, and periodic elections. They insist on the
centrality of what pluralism scorned: widespread political participation . . . .
[T]he cultural patterns they emphasize are different: instead of bargaining and
adherence to “rules of the game,” we have . . . a commitment to reason and
civility (in the case[] of civic republicanism . . . ) . . . .
Id. at 1769. Again, Hamilton does not favor civic republicanism on a broad, popular
scale, but she argues for something very much like it with respect to the legislature.
173. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 94.
174. Id. at 76.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 65.
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in maintaining their neighborhood characters.177 However, religious
accommodation may not be the bottom rung: she may perhaps favor
religious accommodation over certain claims of educational disruption178
and the military’s interest in esprit de corps and unity.179
The difficulty with this particular theory of the public good is not that
it relies on legislators’ (or Hamilton’s) policy preferences. Indeed, we
have been searching for some substantive content to give shape to
Hamilton’s conception of the public good; policy preferences of one
kind or another are a promising candidate for this task. In fact, Hamilton
is at her most candid when she argues for her own policy preferences,
perhaps indicating that her personal beliefs rather than any grander
theory often drive her impassioned rhetoric about the public good.
Rather, the difficulties with this approach are twofold. First, Hamilton
has not explained why the particular policies that she favors should be
universalized in the name of the “public good.” That is, if what she
wants is that the legislator be free to enact her (the legislator’s) policy
preferences, how can Hamilton claim that a religiously inclined
legislator, or one who favors religious accommodation, should instead
share her (Hamilton’s) own view of the public good? Second, a theory
of simple policy preferences does not account for Hamilton’s particular
skepticism about the value of religious belief and accommodation in the
public good calculus. That skepticism requires closer inspection.
IV. THE PUBLIC GOOD AS THE EXCLUSION OR DEVALUATION OF
CERTAIN RELIGIOUS INTERESTS
It should by now be clear that Hamilton harbors a special distrust of
certain religious interests. Indeed, perhaps the principal merit of God vs.
the Gavel is its often harrowing portrayal of the abuses of religious
organizations in contemporary American culture and its clear-eyed
examination of the considerable power religious advocates and lobbyists
wield before Congress. Does Hamilton believe that religious interests
could ever play a role in shaping her public good? In fairness, Hamilton
frequently gestures in the direction of acknowledging some role for
religious views. But her comments on this front are resigned. She says
that religion is too deeply entrenched in the American psyche to be
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 89.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 171.
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entirely extricated from the debate over the public good.180 For Hamilton,
religion is everywhere, “inescapable,” and cannot be ignored.181
We are looking for a conceptual framework for understanding the type
of religious beliefs and interests that Hamilton would exclude from the
sphere of public judgment, and the type of religious beliefs and interests
that she feels should be given no greater weight than any other beliefs or
interests. Hamilton certainly favors religious liberty of a kind. She
opposes laws that display patent animus toward particular religions,182
and supports the freedom to speak and believe as one wills.183 However,
she also claims that certain religious interests have no legitimate place in
the sphere of public debate and she opposes giving special weight to
religious beliefs when those beliefs run up against other interests that
government might deem legitimate.184
In order to understand better Hamilton’s public good, we need to
examine more closely and distinguish among the relevant kinds of
religious interests that she might or might not admit to the sphere of
deliberation over the public good. A return to some of Professor
Greenawalt’s fine divisions is useful. A religious interest is, first,
“religious”: if we accept, for this purpose, Greenawalt’s broad and
highly inclusive definition, religion’s source lies in some kind of
“theistic belief or other belief about a realm of ultimate value beyond, or
deeper than, ordinary human experience.”185 Second, it is an “interest”:
the holder of the religious belief wishes to do something with it. He may
simply wish to believe it silently; or he may wish to impose it as a law
binding on himself and everyone else; or he may wish to do a host of
other things with it.
At one extreme of the possible range of religious interests lies what
Greenawalt has called the imposition of comprehensive religious beliefs.186
If Donna is a Christian whose political judgments are shaped entirely by
her belief in the literal truth of Holy Scripture as the received will of
God, Donna has a comprehensive religious belief. Suppose that Donna
is a legislator and votes for a law that would establish Christianity, as
she understands it, as the supreme law of the land and would outlaw all
other religious beliefs. Her interest is one of imposition. I believe that

180. Id. at 292-93.
181. Id. at 288, 292-93.
182. Id. at 214-16 (describing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993)).
183. Id. at 26.
184. Id. at 287-88.
185. GREENAWALT, supra note 45, at 39.
186. Id. at 58.
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Professor Hamilton,187 like most people, would oppose such a religious
interest; she would want to exclude it from consideration of the public
good.188 If Donna, holding the same comprehensive religious views,
voted to pass a law outlawing gay marriage for the single reason that
homosexuality is anathema to God’s will (that is, the imposition of a
particular religious belief by one who holds a comprehensive religious
view),189 Hamilton would likely argue not only that the putative law is
unsound but also that Donna’s views should be excluded from the public
good calculus.190
Suppose, instead, that Phyllis’s reasons for voting for the ban on gay
marriage derive both from her religious convictions and from her views
that the institution of homosexual marriage cannot be rationally
defended. Her underlying grounds are partly religious; she believes that
homosexual marriage is inconsistent with God’s will. But by opposing
homosexual marriage she does not wish to impose her religious views on
anyone else because, in addition to her religious reasons, she also feels
strongly that the institution and traditions of heterosexual marriage, and
the secular human goods that it serves, are harmed if gay marriage is not
officially prohibited. Suppose that she is able to adduce what for her are
principled arguments about gay marriage’s deleterious effects on the
institution of heterosexual marriage as well as other data that could
support her secular belief in the harm of homosexual marriage.191 I
believe that Hamilton would exclude this religious interest from public
good considerations as well. Even if Hamilton might agree that there are
some legitimate, nonreligious reasons for supporting the ban, which is
doubtful,192 she would claim that the reliance on a religious reason in
187. In what follows, I attempt to divine Professor Hamilton’s position on a number
of hypothetical situations on the basis of her claims in God vs. the Gavel, in an effort to
pinpoint her public good doctrine. I have no reason to know whether Professor Hamilton
would actually agree with the positions staked out for her.
188. “Exclusion” might entail formally admitting the view, but giving it very little
or no weight as a practical matter.
189. It makes no difference what Donna’s publicly expressed views are (for
example, that homosexuality is irrational or harmful to some secular good, et cetera) if
Donna’s true reasons for supporting the law stem from religious conviction.
190. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 50 (“The hard choices depend on a more broadranging inquiry than any one religious worldview encompasses (even when that
perspective is shared by a significant number of individuals and institutions).”).
191. I assume, for the sake of this argument, that Phyillis’s arguments could
withstand some scrutiny, though they need not be iron clad for her to be persuaded by
them.
192. Id. at 52-66.
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this case is the overwhelming impetus for the law. If the law were
passed, it would compel “nonbelievers to conform to a standard of
conduct inspired in large measure by religious belief,”193 which amounts
to a religious imposition. It is important to emphasize that Hamilton’s
reasons, as I hypothesize them, for excluding or giving very little to no
weight to this religious interest would have little to do with what Phyllis
believes about her (Phyllis’s) position; they instead implicate solely
what Hamilton (or the ideal legislator) believes about those views.
One further illustration: Lisa believes that animals should not be
treated inhumanely. Her reasons for supporting a farming regulation
governing the decent treatment of animals before they are slaughtered
stem in part from her belief that the Bible demands concern for animals.
However, she also is persuaded by secular arguments that animals
deserve a high degree of respect from humans. She has no wish to see
the law pass in order to impose her religious views on those that do not
share them. She believes the law is just because she cares about animals
and her reasons are mixed.194
Structurally, Phyllis’s and Lisa’s positions are identical. Both have
religious interests. Neither wishes to impose her religious views on
others. Each supports (or believes that she supports) the prospective law
in question for both religious and secular reasons. Being religious
themselves, both would find it exceedingly difficult to disentangle and
cull out the religious from the secular reasons for supporting the
respective laws. As Professor Steven Smith has said, “[t]he religious
citizen supports not two severable propositions but rather the single,
complex proposition that secular and religious influences must both play
a part in public decisions.”195
Nevertheless, I believe that Hamilton would draw a distinction between
the two positions. Though she would exclude Phyllis’s religious interest
from the domain of the public good, she would admit Lisa’s. Her reason
would be that, in this context, the religious interest is reasonable because
it closely aligns with legitimate secular interests. “Citizens may speak
from the heart and soul, but it is up to our elected officials to contextualize
the debate by adding the scope of the public good to all public
consideration.”196 By “contextualize the debate,” Hamilton means that
the ideal legislator should analyze the religious interest from a secular
193. Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 184 (1991).
194. I owe the framework for this hypothetical to Professor Greenawalt.
GREENAWALT, supra note 45, at 58-59.
195. Steven D. Smith, Separation and the “Secular”: Reconstructing the
Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 1010 (1989).
196. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 51.
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standpoint to determine whether it aligns with the legislator’s determination
of the public good. In Lisa’s case, the ideal legislator should consider
her religious belief in light of the larger context of secular reasons for
the humane treatment of animals, balancing these against opposed
interests, in determining the public good. Hamilton would not give any
more weight to Lisa’s religious reasons than to other secular reasons,
whether supporting or opposing the law. But she would include them in
the calculus because they can be squarely reconciled with convincing
secular arguments in favor of her position.
This is close to a skeptical or “prudential”197 argument for simple,
secular policy preferences. But it differs in an important way: it is a fullbodied belief in (or theory of) the ability of the legislature to conduct an
individuated inquiry and determination of the reasonableness, by secular
lights, of particular religious interests. For Hamilton, whether religious
interests can play a role in the public good will depend on their
compatibility with what the ideal legislator deems legitimate secular
interests. If they are highly compatible, the ideal legislator can include
the religious interest as one more reason in his assessment of the public
good. If not, the religious interests are best excluded.
All of this—indeed, the entire tone and argumentation of the book—
reinforces the exquisitely particularized quality of Professor Hamilton’s
public good theory and her seemingly limitless faith in the powers and
capabilities of legislators. It also grossly overestimates the number of
difficult moral and social issues that can be resolved satisfactorily by
reference to secular objectives alone. “[E]veryone must reach beyond
commonly accessible reasons to decide many social issues and . . . religious
bases for such decisions should not be disfavored in comparison with
other possible bases.”198 “Everyone” presumably includes legislators,
even idealized ones, as Greenawalt cautiously acknowledges.199
197. E.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 99-117 (1995). Professor Smith
argues that, even if one accepts the dubious proposition that the religion clauses and the
Constitution generally establish an avowedly secular regime, secular rationales leave the
value of religious freedom to “prudential” or contextual concerns, which are incapable of
being expounded by any unifying theory.
198. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 113
(1988).
199. Greenawalt notes:
When we turn to legislators relying on their own convictions, the place of
religion is more controversial. As a public representative in a state that is
separated from religious organizations, perhaps the legislator should eschew
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Hamilton’s generally dim view of religious interests in the numerous
examples that she provides bespeaks a strong disinclination to
countenance them in deciding what is good policy, an aversion so
powerful that it blinds her to the considerable legislative abuses that she
recounts. The accommodation of religious interests, she believes, often
tends to do more harm than good. For example, Hamilton argues that
expansive religious accommodation is more likely to lead to strife,
interdenominational and otherwise, itself inconsistent with the public
good, than an approach that treats religious interests no differently than
any other interest.200 This view is especially evident when Hamilton
discusses land use conflicts, where she claims that religious organizations
have sued to enforce their rights under RLUIPA “[i]nstead of finding a
middle ground” with their opponents.201 The view also appears when
Hamilton claims that religious accommodation somehow injects
discrimination into a dispute where it would not otherwise exist, making
rational, cool-headed, and just resolutions that would “serv[e]
everyone’s interest” more difficult.202 In fact, however, Hamilton points
to no evidence that religiously motivated strife in contemporary America
is more rampant, noxious, or divisive than strife of any other kind.203
In the end, Hamilton’s view of the public good is best characterized as
one in which religious interests might shape policy, but only if they can
be justified to a high degree by secular reasons. Her profound
reliance on religious premises insofar as he can. Everything I have said so far
indicates how hard this might be to accomplish, but nonreliance might at least
be held up as an ideal.
Id. at 237.
In the face of Greenawalt’s arguments, I am less persuaded that total nonreliance is
ideal. In fact, in what follows, Greenawalt himself does not argue for total nonreliance,
but identifies certain nuances, for example, intensity of conviction and notions of serious
wrongs, id. at 238, that might affect the propriety of reliance on religious belief.
200. See Hamilton, supra note 113, at 1216. As a practical matter, it may be that
Hamilton would accept some consideration of religious interests in developing policy.
But her reasons for doing so would not be the belief that decisions favoring religious
interests sometimes advance the public good; instead, she might countenance religious
interests because so many people find religious reasons to be important.
201. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 101.
202. Id. at 94 (“The best result in every land use dispute is the win-win result.”).
This observation is probably as true as it is practically useless.
203. Michael J. Perry, Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality Is
Not Illegitimate in a Liberal Democracy, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217, 231 (2001)
(“American history does not suggest that religiously grounded arguments about
controversial political-moral issues—racial discrimination, for example, or war—are
invariably, or even usually, more divisive than secular debates about those issues.”
(footnote omitted)); see also Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim
That Religious Arguments Should Be Excluded From Democratic Deliberation, 1999
UTAH L. REV. 639, 643 (1999) (“[T]he supposed divisiveness, intolerance, and
absolutism of religious argument neither distinguishes it from secular ideology nor
provides a justification for exclusion from democratic politics . . . .”).
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disillusionment with the moral authority of religious organizations and
persons left her seeking a repository for her conviction that somebody,
or some entity, should be acting in the public interest. With plausible
constitutional reason, she has selected the legislature to be the bearer of
her trust. But the task she has assigned to it—to decide, case-by-case,
whether specific religious interests deserve government protection by
reference to their secular worth—is beyond both the legislature’s
institutional abilities and its members’ personal capacity for moral
judgment.
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